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Recent economic and sociological research has suggested the importance of social
capital as a determinant of economic performance. In a seminal contribution to the body
of research, Putnam (1993) finds that local governments of Italian regions characterized
by strong civic participation, perform better when delivering public goods. Corroborating
Putnam's findings worldwide, La Porta et al. (1997) find that in a cross section of
countries, trust and civic engagement are associated with improvements in the
performance of firms and the government. Finally, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that in
a cross section of countries, trust and civic engagement have a significant positive effect
on economic growth even once controlling for other factors such as initial income and
educational level. These last two studies rely on trust and civic engagement data from the
World Value Surveys (WVS) of 1981 and 1990-1991 to quantify social capital.
In this investigation we propose a new measure of social capital and implicitly
ask: are the World Value Surveys reliable and do they measure social capital effectively?
These surveys could potentially be subject to cultural biases in responding and reporting
simply because there is no uniform standard of trustworthiness or because it is
cumbersome to translate notions of trustworthiness from one language to another. To
speak of trustworthiness in Chinese may not be the same as speaking of trustworthiness
in Italian and much less in Hausa. Furthermore, these surveys do not capture long-term
trends in social capital given that the surveys occur in two waves within a ten-year
interval.  Thus, it is not clear whether the data of the World Value Surveys is the result of
a net change in social capital or merely opportune snapshots of the social climate in
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countries around the world. Furthermore, the validity of inferences made based on such
limited data is questionable.
This study attempts to confirm the conclusions of the previously mentioned works
by using voter turnout in parliamentary elections as a measure of social capital, as
previously suggested by Putnam (2000). Our analysis differs from the previous two by
considering data over a fifty-year period (1950-2000), in an attempt to capture the effect
that social capital may have on long-run economic performance. In addition, our measure
of social capital is based on an observable behavior —voting— rather than a reported
belief—trust. By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on our cross section of countries,
we attempt to estimate the effect that increasing voter turnout in parliamentary elections
has on economic growth, once other macroeconomic factors are controlled. Given the
nature of this study, it is possible that our dependent variable and one (or several) of the
independent variables are determined simultaneously leading to a bias in estimation if
this is not controlled. Also it is possible that our dependent variable causes the
independent variables leading to a reverse causation or endogeneity bias. To control for
these biases in estimation, we will use instrumental variable (IV) and two-stage least
squares (2SLS) techniques.
Our initial findings suggest that once other factors are controlled, voter turnout
does not have a significant effect on economic growth. This could be the result of one of
the following possibilities: (1) voter turnout is an inaccurate measure of social capital; (2)
social capital does not have a significant effect on long-run growth once other
macroeconomic variables are controlled; or (3) the mechanism through which voter
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turnout (as a measure of social capital) influences long-run growth is not as direct as our
initial specification dictates.
Given La Porta et al.'s (1997) findings on the positive relationship between
performance of large organizations and social capital and, Knack and Keefer's (1997)
findings of a strong relationship between social capital and confidence in the government,
we examine the possibility that our measure of social capital improves government
performance. Following La Porta et al.'s (1997) framework we conclude that our measure
of social capital is very significant for government performance when using a variety of
measures of the perceived efficacy of the government. Following the widespread
literature on the fundamental importance of institutions for growth [e.g. Acemoglu et al.
(2004) or Hall and Jones (1999)], we suggest that the economic pay-off of social capital
is via increased government performance—concurring with  (3) as mentioned above.
This thesis is divided as follows. In section 2 we present an overview of the
literature central to this investigation. In section 3 we present our baseline specification
and use it to estimate the effect of social capital on growth using OLS and IV/2SLS
techniques. In section 4 we consider one specific channel through which social capital
may indirectly induce growth—government performance. Finally, in section 5 we
conclude.
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2. Review of the Literature
In this section we review the three main publications that this thesis is premised
on. Central to our discussion is Putnam's (2000) book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and
Decline of American Community. Given that much of our empirical work will hinge on
claims of this book, the first portion of this section will provide a brief overview of the
arguments of this work that are central to the analysis in section 3. Similarly, the second
portion of this section will provide an overview of Hayek's (1944) The Road to Serfdom.
Finally, we will review one of the most recent counterparts to our empirical analysis:
Knack and Keefer's (1997) article "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-off?"
2.1 Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Decline of American Community
 Based on social capital theory, Robert D. Putnam attempts to explain the decline
of civic and social life in American communities.  He begins by explaining that the
central tenet of social capital theory is that social networks have value since social
contacts can affect the productivity of individuals and groups. "Social capital refers to
connections among individuals —social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them (pg. 19)." Putnam goes on to explain that social
capital has both an individual and collective aspect. For individuals, social capital helps
to find jobs and companionship, while collectively social capital can have externalities
that affect a whole community rather than just the person making the contact.   In
addition, Putnam emphasizes that social connections are also important because they
foster norms of reciprocity. Particularly important to our future discussion is what
Putnam calls generalized reciprocity: "I'll do this for you without expecting anything
specific back from you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do something
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for me down the road (pg. 21)." Putnam argues that "a society characterized by
generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason
that money is more efficient than barter. If we don't have to exchange instantly, we can
get a lot more accomplished (pg. 21)"—this difference between social capital rich and
poor societies is what we test. In addition, Putnam argues that when economic and
political dealing is contained in dense social interaction, incentives to rent-seek are
reduced.
In support of his hypothesis of America's declining social capital, in chapter 2
Putnam shows the important decrease in political participation by Americans. To
motivate the importance of the decline in voter turnout, Putnam explains that "voting is
the most common form of political activity and it embodies the most fundamental
democratic principle of equality. Not to vote is to withdraw from the political community
(pg. 35)." Furthermore, he argues that voting is an instructive proxy measure of broader
social change: voters are more likely to be interested in politics, give to charity,
volunteer, participate in public demonstrations and to cooperate with fellow citizens on
community affairs. Putnam claims that recent work [i.e. Knack (1992), Conway (1991)
and McCann (1998)] suggests that voting itself encourages volunteering and other forms
of good citizenship.
In chapter 8, Putnam discusses reciprocity and trust. Putnam argues that trusting
communities have a measurable economic advantage since they reduce transactions costs.
Furthermore, Putnam argues that while a legal system can give us assurance of the good
faith of others another solution to this problem is generalized reciprocity, which can exist
in dense networks of social exchange.   Similar to voter turnout, social trust seems to
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have peeked in the US in the mid 1960s and declined thereafter. As a measure of
trustworthiness and honesty, Putnam offers crime rates. He argues that crime maybe a
symptom of weakened social control and shows that crime rates began to rise sharply in
the middle of the 1960s at the same time as other measures of social capital and trust
began to decline. Again Putnam argues that an alternative to generalized reciprocity is the
rule of law and supports his claim by showing that starting in the 1970s the number of
lawyers in the US steadily increased. While it can be argued that this is the result of
increasing crime rates, there was no major growth in criminal law during this period.
Putnam states that the largest increase in demand for legal work was in the form of
"preventive lawyering" or the need to "get it in writing." Putnam argues that this reflects
America's heavy reliance on formal institutions rather than using informal networks
supported by generalized reciprocity.
Next and essential to our discussion, Putnam presents his "Social Capital Index"
in chapter 16. Using various independent measures, Putnam attempts to rate social capital
in the 50 states. Putnam's index includes measures of community organizational life,
engagement in public affairs, community volunteerism, informal sociability and social
trust. He goes on to argue that the fourteen indicators measure related but distinct facets
of social capital. Of particular importance to us is one of Putnam's engagement in public
affairs measure, voter turnout in presidential elections 1988 and 1992. While no single
measure can define a state's social capital, Putnam argues that interstate differences seem
to go together given the correlations of the individual measures with the overall index
(e.g. places with high electoral turnout tend to have high social trust). For example,
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Putnam's measure of social trust has a correlation of 0.92 with the overall index while
turnout in presidential elections has a correlation of 0.84 with the overall index.
Also key to our analysis is Putnam's discussion of economic prosperity and its
relation to social capital in chapter 19.  At the microeconomic level, Putnam argues that
social capital helps us surmount employment barriers and allows us to achieve social
status and economic rewards. As an example, Putnam compares the success of
California's Silicon Valley and demise of Boston's route 128. While route 128 maintained
traditional norms of corporate hierarchy, secrecy and self-sufficiency, Silicon Valley
entrepreneurs shared information, problem-solving techniques and created social clubs.
Putnam suggests that Silicon Valley's industrial system based on regional networking
allowed for flexibility and dynamic technological adoption as opposed to route 128 rigid
experimentation and learning confined within individual firms. According to Putnam,
industrial districts like Silicon Valley allow for information flows and economies of
scale. Putnam concludes the chapter by encouraging the view that social capital may
boost economic efficiency —benefiting all— albeit the unclear aggregate evidence.
Chapter 20 focuses on the importance of social connectedness on health and well-
being. Putnam argues that social cohesion is beneficial for health since social networks
can provide tangible assistance that reduces physical and psychic stress.   He also argues
that social networks may reinforce healthy norms—since isolated people are more likely
to smoke and drink— and that social capital may stimulate the immune system to fight
disease and stress. Putnam also cites work done at Harvard's School of Public Health,
which finds a strong link between physical health and social capital across the US. States
with fair or poor health were the same where residents distrusted others; states with low
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scores on the "Social Capital Index" also had poor health and high all-cause mortality
rates. Putnam concludes that social networks allow us to stay healthy.
Finally, in chapter 21 Putnam mentions the role social capital plays in improving
democracy. Externally, social capital, in the form of voluntary organizations, allows
individuals to express their interests and demands on the government and provides
protection from abuses of political leaders. Internally, associations and networks of civic
engagement instill in their members habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness while
providing practical skills necessary for public life. In this sense, voluntary organizations
are "schools for democracy."  Furthermore, Putnam suggests that social capital may
improve the functioning and accountability of the representative government. When
comparing the Northern and Southern regions of Italy, Putnam finds that in the Northern
regions—where social networks were organized horizontally and where solidarity, civic
participation and integrity are valued—democracy works. In the Southern regions
characterized by weak social engagement and cultural associations, the representative
government is less effective. Putnam also suggests that social capital matters for the
functioning of the government in the US. In social capital rich states, politics is more
issue oriented and apparently less corrupt.
2.2 The Road to Serfdom
In this work, Friedrich Von Hayek issues a warning regarding the political
direction that democracies such as the US and England are leaning towards after World
War II. Throughout this book Hayek expresses his concern that collectivism and social
planning can ultimately lead to the destruction of political and economic freedom. While
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supporting individualism over collectivism, Hayek also provides arguments for the strong
correlation between democracy and economic growth.
Hayek explains that the gradual transformation from a rigidly organized
hierarchic system into one where men could attempt to shape their own life was closely
associated with the growth of commerce (1944, pg. 14). Hayek also argues that this
commercial growth "took firm root wherever there was no despotic political power to
stifle it. In the Low Countries and Britain it for a long time enjoyed its fullest
development and for the first time had an opportunity to grow freely and to become the
foundation of the social and political life of these countries (pg. 14-15)." Furthermore,
Hayek argues that during the modern period of European history "the general direction of
social development was one of freeing the individual from ties which had bound his
activities; the conscious realization that the spontaneous and uncontrolled efforts of
individuals were capable of producing a complex order of economic activities could only
come after this development had made some progress (pg. 15)." "The subsequent
elaboration of a consistent argument in favor of economic freedom was the outcome of a
free growth of economic activity which had been the undesigned and unforeseen by-
product of political freedom (pg. 15)."  In addition, when talking about liberalism Hayek
argues that "the immediate improvement of liberalism had to rely largely on the gradual
increase of wealth which freedom brought about (pg. 19)." Stressing the importance of
democracy for freedom, Hayek quotes De Tocqueville's claim that "democracy extends
the sphere of individual freedom; socialism restricts it (pg. 25)."  Thus, from Hayek's
work we can argue reverse causation and simultaneous determination of economic
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growth and democracy since the development of one produces (and requires) the
development of the other.
2.3 Does Social Capital Have An Economic Pay-off?
In this article, Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer address empirically the question
of the impact social capital has on economic growth. Knack and Keefer use data from the
World Values Surveys (WVS) 1981 and 1990-1991 in creating their TRUST variable
representing social capital. TRUST is percentage of respondents in each nation replying
"most people can be trusted" when asked "generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Knack and
Keefer find a strong and significant relationship between social capital and growth when
using this measure of social capital and controlling for human capital (primary and
secondary school enrollment), initial income (real GDP per capita in 1980) and the price
level of investment goods (relative to the US). Even when using ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and the number of law students in 1963 as a percentage of all
postsecondary students as instruments for social capital, TRUST remains a predictor of
growth.
Next Knack and Keefer consider channels through which trust may affect
economic outcomes. In particular, they consider the impact trust may have on property
and contractual rights and, the impact trust may have on government performance. When
controlling for human capital levels and initial income, Knack and Keefer find that their
TRUST variable is the only significant predictor of government performance (an index
based on data from the WVS). Similarly, when considering risk faced by foreign
investors Knack and Keefer find that TRUST significantly predicts this risk. Finally,
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Knack and Keefer find significant relationships between TRUST and property rights
security and, TRUST and "executive constraints." Knack and Keefer then suggest that
trust may improve governmental efficiency and increase investors' confidence in contract
enforcement. However, they are unable to explain the direct path through which trust
affects economic performance since their property rights measures and confidence in the
government are borderline significant in growth regressions or investment regressions.
Therefore, while Knack and Keefer's intermediate findings are very promising, overall
they are unable to provide conclusive evidence for the mechanism through which social
capital can improve economic performance.
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3. Initial Results
 This chapter will present a series of specifications that attempt to measure the
social capital effect on economic growth. First, we will mention our expectations and
present our basic model. We continue by giving reasons for the construction of our model
and proceed with its estimation. After presenting our initial results, we show the
robustness of them with IV and 2SLS techniques. Finally, we will conclude the chapter
by attempting to coalesce our expectations and empirical findings.
3.1 Expectations A Priori
In this subsection we will present our expectations prior to any regression
analysis. First, we will support voter turnout as a measure of social capital with previous
findings in the literature. Then we will present some graphical evidence that suggests the
feasibility of our expectations. Finally, we will highlight our main expectations.
According to Knack and Keefer (1997, pg. 4) "knowledge of politics and public
affairs by large numbers of citizens, and their participation, are important potential
checks on the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to enrich themselves or narrow
interests that they are allied with." Putnam (2000, pg. 35) argues that "voting is the most
common form of political activity, and it embodies the most fundamental democratic
principle of equality. Not to vote is to withdraw from the political community." As a
measure of social capital Putnam (2000, pg. 35) stresses that: "voting is an instructive
proxy measure of broader social change. Voters are more likely to be interested in
politics, give to charity, volunteer, serve on juries, attend community school board
meetings..." However, Putnam (2000) later admits that voting and following politics are
relatively undemanding forms of participation and strictly speaking are not forms of
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social capital since they can be done alone (pg. 37). For this reason it is possible that
voting may in fact overstate the stock of social capital in a nation.
 Given Knack and Keefer's (1997) results on the strong association between trust,
civic norms and stronger economic performance, our initial suspicion is that we may be
able to find a positive relationship between our measure of social capital —voter
turnout— and economic performance. In constructing the "Social Capital Index" for his
US study, Putnam (2000) finds a strong correlation between his index and voter turnout
(0.84). The analogue of Knack and Keefer's (1997) TRUST variable in Putnam's (2000)
index has a correlation of 0.92 with the overall index (the strongest for any single
component). When comparing our measure of social capital to the trust data from the
World Values Survey used in constructing the TRUST variable in Knack and Keefer
(1997), we find a modest correlation of 0.45. Graphically this relationship is depicted in
figure 1.
Thus, given Putnam's (2000) and Knack and Keefer's (1997) findings there is: (1)
evidence that voter turnout may be useful as a measure of social capital; and (2) evidence
that social capital in fact has an effect on growth. However, since voting can be done
alone (as mentioned above) we must emphasize that our measure of social capital can
overstate the actual level of social capital and hence inflate our results. Therefore, if we
find statistically significant results in favor of a social capital effect on growth, these
should be understood as upper bounds of the true effect. As a prologue to our series of
statistical tests, we plot the relationship between the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000



















































































3.2 The Model and Basic Results
In this subsection we will present our formal model and basic results. First we
will present the model and give reasons for its construction. Next, we report our initial
results. Finally, we discuss shortcomings of our model.











2000  is the logarithm of real GDP per capita in the year 2000 (acting as
our measure of income); 
€ 
β0  is the intercept term (constant over all countries); 
€ 
votei  is our
voter turnout measure; 
€ 
log ki
2000  is the natural logarithm of the approximate capital stock
per capita in 2000; 
€ 
logGDPi
1950 is the logarithm of the initial real GDP per capita; 
€ 
enrolli
is the gross secondary enrollment ratio averaged over 1960-2000 and 
€ 
εi  is the classical
error term.
Following Knack and Keefer's (1997) and La Porta et al.'s (1997) specifications,
we assume that the intercept term is constant over all countries, implying an equal
income level for all countries when none of the explanatory variables are present and no
country specific or time specific exogenous shocks to income exist.  Rather than
controlling for the price level of investment (relative to the US) as in Knack and Keefer
(1997), we control for the capital stock of each country, since differences in capital stocks
can help explain differences in income and since we are trying to follow the growth
specifications proposed by Mankiw et al. (1992). As our measure of social capital, we use
voting in parliamentary elections to represent voter turnout instead of voting in
presidential elections. Choosing the latter would restrict the list of countries included in
20
our analysis given that not all countries have an executive power embodied in a president,
yet many do have a legislative power. Specifically, our measure of voter turnout is the
number of votes divided by the voting age population figure [since this is the type of
voter turnout figure used in constructing Putnam's (2000) "Social Capital Index"]. We
include the gross secondary enrollment ratio as a measure of human capital, given that a
more human capital can induce stronger growth (Barro, 1991). Finally, the initial level of
real GDP per capita, 
€ 
logGDP1950 is included in our specification to control for
convergence. Our baseline specification essentially implies that the ideal country from
our dataset produces output based on endowments of physical capital, human capital and
social capital. The error term in this model represents immeasurable factors such as
technological advances. The results of running OLS on this baseline specification appear
in Table 1.






















Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦significant at 10% level *significant at 5% level
**significant at 1% level.
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Our initial regression implies a negative and insignificant relationship between
voter turnout and growth. The relatively high p-value for 
€ 
vote  (0.45) reflects its
inadequacy as an explanatory variable of growth. At this point, it is important to mention
the effect of compulsory voting laws on voter turnout. While many countries do have
compulsory voting laws with penalties ranging from minor fines to possible
imprisonment, rarely are these laws enforced. When including dummy variables for
compulsory voting laws and variables that measure the level of enforcement of these laws
in unreported regressions, we systematically fail to reject that the coefficients on these
variables are not statistically significant from 0. Thus, in order to avoid irrelevant
variable biases in our regressions, we do not include them.
As expected, a larger capital stock reflects higher income per capita. In particular,
our estimated coefficient (interpreted as an elasticity) implies that a 1% increase the
capital stock of the year 2000 will increase income per capita by roughly .68%. In
addition, the significant and positive coefficient on the initial level of GDP per capita
implies that countries will not converge conditionally.   An 11% increase in GDP per
capita of 1950 results in an increase in income in the year 2000 by .15%. While this at
first may be surprising, the heterogeneity in final income levels of our data set suggests
historical divergence of incomes between the richest and poorest countries in our sample.
Our initial results would support Pritchett's (1997) findings of considerable divergence in
incomes between the richest countries in the world and the rest. Furthermore, our
estimated coefficient may reflect that divergence in economic performance can only
captured in the long-run (such as our examined 50 year period) while 20-year studies may
capture some convergence. Also since our dependent variable is final income, the
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coefficient on initial income implies no beta convergence, which does not contradict
previous findings of sigma convergence.
Surprisingly, we find that our human capital measure is insignificant—i.e.,
increases in secondary enrollment are not associated with increases in income. While this
is inconsistent with our prior expectations and other results in the literature, we can offer
an explanation for the insignificance human capital in our regressions. It is very likely
that better educated countries will tend to vote more and participate in other civic
activities more (relative to less educated countries) since civic responsibility can be
instilled through schooling. Furthermore, Barro (1991) finds that initial human capital has
a positive effect on physical investment leading us to believe that human capital may
have a similar effect on our capital stock measure. Thus, it is possible that part of
education's explanatory power on final income is being shared by our social capital and
physical capital measures. In our sample of countries, human capital is correlated with
social capital and physical capital with correlation coefficients of 0.57 and 0.79
respectively.
A process that we are overlooking and which may be affecting our voter turnout
coefficient is the simultaneity between growth in incomes and voter turnout, due to the
latter acting as a measure of political and personal liberty. From Hayek's (1944)
discussion on the evolution of personal liberty and economic prosperity we can suggest
that economic growth and political freedom are determined simultaneously. Putnam
(2000) argues that "voting embodies the most fundamental democratic principle of
equality," while Hayek (1960) points out that equality in front of the law and in making
the law is the where the ideas of democracy and liberalism meet. Thus, we can argue that
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higher voter turnout reflects a stronger democracy where individual liberty is upheld.
Hence, there may be some reverse causality between rising incomes and voter turnout as
the latter may represent the level of democracy in a nation.
3.3 IV and 2SLS Regressions
To circumvent the reverse causality and simultaneity biases, in the next
specifications we attempt two stage least squares (2SLS) and instrumental variables (IV)
techniques to estimate the effect that voter turnout may have on final income. With this
approach, we should be able to isolate the true exogenous effect that voter turnout has on
income.  This in turn could change our initial results and provide empirical evidence in
favor of Putnam's claim that voting is an instructive proxy for social capital. First, we will
have a technical digression on how IV and 2SLS work. Then, we will use a series of
instruments and present results when using each instrument.
3.3.1 Technical Digression: IV and 2SLS
Instrumental variables (IV) and two-stage least squares are regression techniques
used whenever one or several of the independent variables in a regression are
endogenous—i.e. not predetermined and thus not orthogonal to the error term. Given the
assumptions of the classical linear model, a regressor not being orthogonal to the error
term is equivalent to the regressor having as non-zero correlation with the error term:
€ 
Cov(εi , xij ) = E[xijεi ]−E[xij ]E[εi ]= E[xijεi ]≠ 0 ,  since 
€ 
E[εi ]= 0 . This poses a problem
when using OLS to estimate a linear equation because coefficient estimates will be biased
since the strict exogeneity assumption of OLS will be violated. Non-zero correlation with
the error term can arise in the following situations: when 
€ 








The instrumental variables (IV) technique circumvents these problems by using a
predetermined (exogenous) variable that is correlated with
€ 
xij  (endogenous regressor) to
estimate a consistent estimate of the coefficient on 
€ 
xij . As an example, if we are
estimating 
€ 
yi =α0 +α1xi +εi , where 
€ 
xi  is correlated with the error term, the IV estimator
of 
€ 
α1  would be:
€ 
ˆ α1,IV =
Cov(zi , yi )
Cov(zi , xi )
where 
€ 
zi  is an exogenous variable called the "instrument" of 
€ 
xi . Intuitively, the IV





yi  deflated or weighed by the portion of 
€ 
xi  which is not determined
by 
€ 
yi . As mentioned above this determination can be through measurement error,
simultaneity or reverse causation.
Another procedure that can be used to avoid endogeneity biases is two-stage least
squares (2SLS). This procedure is called 2SLS since it entails running two regressions: in
the first stage the endogenous variable is regressed on an instrument(s) and a constant to
obtain fitted values of the endogenous variable. In the second stage, these fitted values
are used to estimate the original equation. In our previous example, the first stage would
consist of estimating 
€ 
xi = γ0 +γ1zi + vi  with OLS and then calculating the fitted values, 
€ 
ˆ xi .
In the second stage, we would use the fitted values to estimate 
€ 
yi =α0 +α1 ˆ xi +εi  to obtain
a consistent estimate of 
€ 
α1 . When using 2SLS we assume that the error terms in the first
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and second stages are uncorrelated. In general, the 2SLS estimator can be written as an
IV estimator when using the appropriate instruments (Hayashi, 2000).
3.3.2 Religion and Legal Origin as Instruments
In this subsection, we will use religion and legal origin as instruments for social
capital. First, we will discuss why is religion is a viable instrument and proceed with the
estimation of our model using 2SLS. Second we will emphasize the usefulness of legal
origin as an instrument for social capital and also estimate our model using 2SLS.
Putnam (1993) argues that hierarchical religions discourage "horizontal" ties
between people and therefore the formation of trust or social capital. La Porta et al.
(1997) find a negative correlation (-0.47) between the percentage of Catholics in a
country and trust. For our sample of countries and measure of social capital the
correlation has the same direction but not as strong (-0.31). This relationship is plotted in
figure 3. The correlation between the incidence of Muslim people and voting is minimal
(.0184), however this figure is misleading since our group of countries is predominantly
Catholic with very low percentages of Muslims. Given that the percentage of Catholic
and Muslim people in a country reflects cultural attitudes and preferences rather than
economic conditions and preferences, we believe that these figures can serve as good
instruments primarily because they should not be determined by contemporaneous
economic conditions. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1997) have also used religion as an









votei = γ0 +γ1catholici
1980 +γ2mus lim i
1980+υi
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The results from using the percentage of Catholics and Muslims in 1980 as instruments
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Figure 3.
Our first 2SLS rejects the claim that voter turnout (as a measure of social capital)
has any effect on income. Furthermore, we maintain the conclusions that a higher capital
stock has a positive effect on income and countries do not beta converge. Again,
secondary school enrollment is insignificant. Looking at the results for the first stage
(table 1), we find that a large Catholic presence in a country is associated with decreases
in voter turnout rates. In particular, a 1% increase in the Catholic population is associated
with a 0.17% decrease in voter turnout. The coefficient on the Muslim variable is not
statistically different from zero but we reiterate that our set of nations offers very low
proportions of Muslims in their population (India being the largest with 11.6%),
hindering us from making any meaningful statements about this coefficient.  However,
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given the results for our Catholic variable, we do find empirical evidence in favor of
Putnam's claim that hierarchical religions are detrimental to social capital yet, we find no
evidence for any social capital effect on income.



































First Stage Voter Turnout





























Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦significant at 10% level *significant at 5% level
**significant at 1% level.
For our second 2SLS regression we use legal origin as an instrument for voter
turnout. Previously in the growth literature, Levine and Zervos (1998) have used legal
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origin as an instrument for financial development to show its link to economic growth.
Here we propose legal origin as an instrument for voter turnout in expectation that
countries whose legal origin is more authoritarian will display lower voter turnout rates,
while countries whose legal origin is more democratic should have higher voter turnout
rates. While at some point in the history of the countries we examine legal origin was
endogenous (the decision made by colonizers to occupy and instate new institutions in a
foreign land may have been determined by the natural resources of this land), present
economic conditions of the period we examine should have no effect on legal origin.
Thus for our model, legal origin appears to be a viable instrument for social capital.
Given that a large proportion of the countries we study are ex-British or French
colonies (and under the assumption that these colonies usually inherit the dominant
religion of the colonizing country), we should expect our results to be similar to those of
the previous regression. For example, in our data set we find a strong correlation between
French legal origin and Catholicism in 1980 (0.79). Therefore, in this 2SLS we should
find a significant effect of French legal origin on voter turnout but no significant effect of















british  and 
€ 
german  are dummies for legal origin and 
€ 
υ is a classical error
term. The results of running this 2SLS regression appear in column 2 of Table 2.
As expected, the first stage shows that French legal origin is statistically
significant at the 10% level (p-value 0.069), while British and German legal origin have
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no significant effects. The coefficient on the dummy variable for French legal origin
implies a considerable penalty on voter turnout if the dummy is active—a decrease in
voter turnout of 17 percentage points relative to countries whose legal origin is
Scandinavian (the omitted group). However, in the second stage we again conclude that
voter turnout has no statistically significant effect on income while capital stock and
initial GDP per capita do. The fact that French legal origin reduces voter turnout should
come as no surprise since the French legal system was a by-product of the Napoleonic
regime. Compared to the Common Law, the Napoleonic code focused on state building
and not on protecting individuals against arbitrary power of the government (Hayek,
1960). Therefore, countries with this type of legal structure should have lower turnout
rates given that any sense of democracy in these countries is probably artificial.
La Porta et al. (1998) find that countries of French legal origin offer the worse
legal protection to investors compared to British and German legal origin countries and
—as adaptations to weak legal protection— have highly concentrated ownership in
companies and mandatory dividends. If Putnam were correct in concluding that legal
structures are substitutes for strong social networks, then we would expect more social
capital in French legal origin countries as a counter-mechanism for weak legal structures.
Our measure of social capital seems to suggest otherwise.
3.3.3 Health and Age Distribution as Instruments
For our next set of regressions, we use health and the age distribution of a country
as instruments for social capital. First, we will give reasons for using measures such as
life expectancy, infant mortality and the crude death rate as instruments for social capital.
Then, we will present the results of using these instruments. Next, we will offer support
30
for using the age distribution of a country as an instrument for social capital. Finally, we
will present the results of using age as an instrument of social capital.
From section II we see that Putnam (2000) offers several theories that explain
why social cohesion matters for health. We can argue that life expectancy (as well as
other mortality and morbidity measures which will be presented below) is a reasonable
instrument for social capital because of Putnam's arguments and the following argument.
While life expectancy is related to economic conditions, life expectancy during our
examine 50 year period was probably determined by prior economic conditions rather
than current economic conditions due to the lag effect between technological advances,
advances in medicine and their manifestations on living standards. A plot of life
expectancy at birth for 1970 (provided from the Global Development Finance and World
Development Indicators) versus voter turnout is presented in figure 4. Similarly, a plot of
average life expectancy at birth (for the years 1950-2000) using data from the IDB is
presented in figure 5. By comparing figures 4 and 5 we can see that the positive linear
relationship between voter turnout and life expectancy is similar when using either initial
levels or averages. Results from using each of these measures of life expectancy as






















































































































Fortunately, the results of using either life expectancy at 1970 or average life
expectancy are similar, supporting the robustness of our previous claims. While the fit
when using the 1970 level is not as strong as when using averages (R2 of 0.85 compared
to 0.94) in both cases voter turnout is insignificant and now with the sign we would
expect under Putnam's hypothesis—positive. Similarly, capital stock in 2000 and initial
GDP per capita remain very strong predictors of future income. Once again secondary
enrollment is insignificant in our regressions. Thus, under Putnam's hypothesis that
societies with stronger social networks are healthier, it seems again that voter turnout is a
poor measure of social capital.
Under the rationale of using life expectancy as an instrument for social capital, we
now instrument social capital with the average crude death rate and average infant
mortality. Putnam (2000) finds a strong negative relationship between the age-adjusted
mortality rate in 1990 and his "Social Capital Index" concluding that mortality is lower in
high social-capital states in the US. We find a weak negative correlation between the
average crude death rate and voter turnout (-0.11), but a relatively strong negative
relationship between average infant mortality and voter turnout (-0.54). The results of
using the average crude death rate and average infant mortality as instruments for social
capital appear respectively, in the third and fourth columns of Table 3.
When using the crude death rate as an instrument for social capital, our results are
questionable. Despite the fact of having a very large F-statistic and R2, only the
coefficient on capital stock is significant. Voter turnout is insignificant and with the
wrong sign. We believe that the underperformance of this fourth IV regression as
compared to the prior four reflects the fact that the death rate is a weak instrument (i.e.
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having low correlation with the endogenous regressor). However, when using the average
infant mortality rate (a much stronger instrument), our results are very similar to the other
IV specifications. Now, voter turnout has the correct sign yet is insignificant while the
capital stock in 2000 and the initial GDP per capita level are both significant at the 1%
and 10% level respectively. Secondary school enrollment remains insignificant. We
conclude again (under the assumption of some relationship between health and social
capital) that social capital does not have an effect on income.
Table 3 Dependent Variable logarithm of GDP per capita 2000
1 2 3 4 5





































































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦significant at 10% level *significant at 5% level
**significant at 1% level.
Next we will aid ourselves with another made by Putnam to construct an
additional instrument for social capital. Putnam (2000) argues that virtually all of the
long-run decline in voter turnout in the US can be attributed to the gradual replacement of
voters who came of age before or during the New Deal and World War II by the
generations who came later (pg. 33). He goes on to argue that "most of social change
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involves both individual and generational processes" and change is easier for young
people (pg. 34). When talking about the gradual widespread use of telephones for long-
distance calls, Putnam argues that generational change became the dominant feature of
this social change (pg. 34). On the basis that change is easier for young people, we would
expect then that countries with younger populations are more encouraging of social
change. Younger countries may be more willing to change deeply embedded social
norms either to increase or decrease social capital. It seems reasonable then to
hypothesize a strong correlation between young populations and social capital.  When
taking the percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 64 (inclusive) and
averaging each of these percentages over the years 1950-2000 we in fact do find a
reasonably strong relationship between young countries and voter turnout of 0.51. This
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The results of estimating this IV regression appear in column 5 of Table 3.
Unfortunately, none of our coefficients are significant. One reason for our poor results is
that there may be a strong correlation between our enrollment measure and the
percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 64. We would expect higher
enrollment rates for countries with a larger portion of the population still in the schooling
ages. This in turn could be introducing multicollinearity in our regression and therefore
producing bad coefficient estimates. It seems then (at least for our specification) that the
percentage of young people in the population is a bad instrument for social capital.
However, we still have additional instruments to test.
3.3.4 Crime, Lawyers and The Social Sciences as Instruments
In this subsection we will use Putnam's claims about crime and written law to
create additional instruments for social capital. First, we will consider using crime rates
as an instrument for social capital and estimate our model using this instrument. To check
the robustness of our results we use the number of riots occruing in a country as a
measure of social capital. Second, we will use the percentage of law students (as a
fraction of the total number of tertiary students) as an instrument for social capital.
Similarly, we will use the percentage of social science students (as a fraction of tertiary
students) as an instrument for social capital.
Putnam (2000) states that, "a potential yardstick for honesty and trustworthiness is
the crime rate (pg. 144)." He shows that crime rates in the US began rising sharply about
the same time that other measures of social capital began to decline. Furthermore, he
argues that crime may be symptom of weakened social control and that the rule of law
becomes the alternative to reciprocity and socially embedded honesty. The problem with
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using crime rates for international comparisons is that many times these figures highly
understate the true figures, since many crimes go unreported. However, following
Fajnzylber, et al.'s (1998) framework, we use international homicides as a measure of
social instability. They argue that international homicides will tend to be more reported
than other national crime rates and thus will reflect better the true underlying social
climate of a nation. We find a strong correlation negative correlation (-0.61) between
international homicides and voter turnout, shown in figure 7. Regarding the possible
endogenous determination of crime rates, we argue that crime rates and in particular
international homicides may only be related to economic conditions of the past rather
than the present and therefore will not be determined by growth occurring during our
examined time period. Furthermore, international homicides may reflect cultural attitudes
such as distrust or resentment towards tourists or foreigners rather than economic
conditions. Under this provision we use the mean international homicide rates reported
by Fajnzylber et al. (1998) as an instrument for social capital. To check the robustness of
our results we use the average number of riots occurring during the years 1950-2000 as
another measure of social instability. The results of running these two IV regressions
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Figure 7.
As expected, both regressions are very similar to each other and to the results of
previous regressions. Both regressions have considerable explanatory power based on
their R2 statistics. In both regressions voting has the wrong sign and is insignificant. The
coefficients for the capital stock in 2000 and initial GDP per capita are both highly
significant and very similar to previous results.  An interesting note to mention here is
that secondary school enrollment is significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.072) in the
international homicide IV regression. Fajnzylber et al. (1998) argue that education has a
delayed crime alleviation effect because this effect does not materialize while the young
are being educated but only once they become adults (pg. 32). Because education has a
lagged effect on crime we should expect that secondary enrollment can be significant at
the same time as our instrumented voter turnout, since education will not have a strong
effect on current crime rates. Again it seems that under another one of Putnam's
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conjectures, voting as a measure of social capital has no effect on income.  For our next
set of instruments we follow the arguments suggested by Knack and Keefer (1997).
Table 4 Dependent Variable logarithm of GDP per capita 2000
1 2 3 4

























































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦significant at 10%  level *significant at 5% level
**significant at 1% level.
Knack and Keefer (1997, pg. 1262) argue that less trusting, more litigious
societies will have a higher demand for lawyers.  Putnam (1993, pg. 126-127) attributes
the proliferation of lawyers in Italian city-states to unusual confidence in written
agreement and the law. Knack and Keefer (1997) find a strong negative relationship
between their TRUST variable and the percentage of law students and also conclude that
the number of law students does not belong in their growth regressions directly. For our
sample we find a negative but weak relationship between voter turnout and the number of
lawyers in a country (-0.36). To check the robustness of our results we use the percentage
of students in the social sciences in 1960 as another instrument for social capital. We
argue that a larger fraction of students in the social sciences reflects a society's interest in
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it's functioning and improvement, since political science, sociology and economics are
included in the social sciences. The results of running these IV regressions appear in the
third and fourth columns (respectively) of Table 4.
Judging by the R2 statistics it appears that using the percentage of students in the
social sciences as an instrument for social capital is the better specification. Furthermore,
it seems also that using the number of law students as an instrument for voting introduces
multicollinearity in the regression. Voting in both regressions is insignificant and with the
wrong sign. In the social science regression the capital stock and initial level of GDP are
significant and with coefficients similar to previous estimates. While the results from this
regression corroborate our previous findings it is important to realize that assuming
Putnam's claim of voting being an "instructive proxy" for social capital, leads us to
contradict Knack and Keefer's  (1997) findings when using similar instruments.
3.3.5 Ethnic Homogeneity as an Instrument
For our final regression of the chapter we use another instrument similar to what
is used in Knack and Keefer (1997).  In their investigation, Knack and Keefer (1997) use
Sullivan's (1991) measure of the proportion of the population belonging to the largest
"ethnolinguistic" group as an instrument for social capital. It seems reasonable to believe
that a polarized society either through religious, ethnic or linguistic divisions, will have
less social capital. Furthermore, the ethnolinguistic make-up of a country should be
determined independently of current economic conditions thus making it a viable
instrument for social capital. A graphical representation of the relationship between voter
turnout and ethnic homogeneity is presented in figure 8. As we can see the simple
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correlation plot confirms our intuition that ethnically homogenous countries should have
more social capital based on the upward sloping direction of the plot.
In addition to using ethnic homogeneity as an instrument for social capital we
include additional variables related to the ethnic composition of a country in an attempt to
quantify more precisely the ethnic issues within a country. Sullivan (1991, pg. 249)
argues that problems with respect to minority rights in matters of social justice are often
more related to levels of ethnic awareness (than to the size of particular groups or to the
total number of such groups in a given country), and these problems are not necessarily
confined to the least homogenous countries. To analyze this problem Sullivan (1991, pg
250) divides 70 states into four categories based upon increasing levels of problems
related to ethnicity. These categories are:
1. ethnically interesting
2. ethnically problematic: states where the majority ruling group's relationship with
some minority is problematic.
3. minority group rules: a minority group rules over larger segments of society but is
apparently accepted to the extent that no insurgency has been provoked.
4. ethnic insurgency: states experiencing an ethnic insurgency.
For each of these four categories we create a dummy variable that is 1 when the
country is included in the category and 0 otherwise. Hence, we use a two-stage least













γ0  is an additional intercept term, 
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homogeni  is the percentage of people






minorityi , and 
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insurgencyi
are dummies for the four categories and 
€ 
υi is a classical error term. Results of
running this 2SLS regression appear in Table 5.
The results of the second stage are very similar to all of our previous results, thus
confirming the robustness of our estimations. It is worth mentioning the results from
the first stage. As expected we find that more ethnic homogeneity is associated with
more social capital. Our coefficient for ethnic homogeneity, which is significant at the
1% level, implies that 1% increase in the proportion of the population belonging to
the largest ethnic group is associated with an increase in turnout a little over half a
percentage point.  More interestingly, if a country is cataloged as ethnically
problematic this is associated with a rise in voter turnout of roughly 20 percentage
points relative to countries who are not ethnically problematic. Ethnically problematic
countries are those who have not encountered violence due to ethnic grievances.
Since no violence occurs we would expect democratic processes such as voting to
remain unaffected in these countries, yet because of the underlying ethnic tensions we
would expect increased voter turnout due to the inclusion of ethnic issues in the
political climate of the nation. We hypothesize that the ethnic insurgency dummy is
not significant since insurgencies of these types reflect deeper social problems that
cannot be solved simply by placing adequate political parties in office. Finally, we
conclude again that voter turnout is irrelevant to income and therefore irrelevant as a
measure of social capital.
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While studying the results of the first stage is interesting and instructive we will
admit that our estimates are probably artificially inflated. Taking the estimated
coefficients as representing the change in the dependent variable (in this case final
income) given the change in one of the independent variables—holding the rest of the
independent variables constant— may be a poor assumption for the first stage. Given
the dynamic nature of the ethnic composition of a country, it seems unlikely that the
effect of being an ethnically problematic state can be fully separated from the effect
of increased homogeneity or having an insurgency. Therefore, it is very likely that
our coefficients are overstating the true effect of changing one explanatory variable




























































































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses. ♦significant at 10% level *significant at 5% level
**significant at 1% level.
3.4 Expectations Revisited
At the beginning of this section we expected to find a relatively small but
statistically significant effect of voter turnout on future income. Particularly motivated by
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Knack and Keefer's (1997) findings, we expected positive results in favor of Putnam's
claim that social capital can have an impact on aggregate economic activity. After a
series of regressions we hypothesize that voter turnout has no direct effect on final
income once other factors are controlled. While our findings do not necessarily contradict
Knack and Keefer's (1997) findings on the economic payoff of social capital, we suggest
either of the following reasons for our disappointing results: (1) voter turnout is not a
good measure of social capital. Given that voting can be done entirely alone, voting does
not represent any form of civic engagement nor does it help predict other behaviors that
may be considered as civic engagement. (2) In the short-run, social capital has an
immediate impact on economic performance while in the long-run the impact social
capital has on economic performance is more subtle. For example, increased voter
turnout may help pass government reforms that facilitate economic growth. If our second
suggestion is correct, then what may be driving our negative results is specification error
since our basic model cannot account for processes such as social capital affecting
government performance. The next section focuses on a new specification that may
capture the indirect channel through which social capital can improve economic
performance.
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4. Social Capital's Impact on Institutions
Given the negative results in favor of a link between our measure of social capital
and growth, in this section we look for channels through which voter turnout may
indirectly affect growth. La Porta et al. (1997) find that social capital improves the
functioning of large organizations such as firms and the government. Thus, it is natural
for us to ask if increased voter turnout —acting as social capital— can improve
government functioning. Given that government quality can be judged based on several
dimensions (such as bureaucratic efficiency or how adamantly it protects of property
rights), we use a series of measures of government performance and examine how our
measure of social capital affects each measure. Furthermore, given the possibility of
reverse causation between improving governments and increasing social capital, we test
the robustness of our results with another series of instrumental variable specifications
using instruments similar to those presented in the previous section.
4.1 Democracy
First, we consider if voter turnout is associated with a more democratic
government. As mentioned in section II, Putnam (2000) argues that social capital
contributes to democracy in two ways. Externally, social capital, in the form of voluntary
organizations, allows individuals to voice interests and demands on the government while
protecting them from arbitrary actions of political leaders. Internally, networks of civic
engagement instill in members habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness. Thus,
intuitively we can expect a positive relationship between voter turnout and more
democracy since voting represents the quintessential act of public-spiritedness—a
democratic precept.
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To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following equation (similar to what has
been done in the literature):
(1) 
€ 




polityi  is a measure of the level of democracy in a nation (taken from the Polity IV







εi  are as defined in
the previous section. This simple functional form implies that physical capital and human
capital do not affect the dependent variable. While this assumption may be problematic,
once we instrument social capital, theoretically we rid the coefficient estimate from
outside influences (such as these influences from physical and human capital, via the
influence they have on final income). The error term in this regression represents
unobserved or immeasurable cultural differences, which affect democracy in each nation.
The results from estimating equation (1) via OLS appear in first column of Table 1.
Our initial regression seems to confirm our suspicion. The statistically significant
coefficient on voter turnout implies that a one standard deviation (15 percentage points)
increase in voter turnout is associated with an increase in the polity score (which ranges
from -10 to 10) of 2.02 points. This change in the polity score would represent a
considerable increase in the perceived i.e. subjective, democracy of a nation. Similarly,
our estimated coefficient for initial income implies that a one standard deviation increase
(0.74 log-points) in the logarithm of initial GDP per capita leads to a 1.66 point increase
in the polity score. Hence, even when controlling for initial income, our social capital































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5%
level,  ** significant at 1% level.
Since higher voter turnout should be expected in more democratic nations it is
possible that our results are being inflated by the simultaneity between voter turnout and
our measure of democracy. To circumvent this effect we run an IV regression using
ethnic homogeneity as an instrument for voter turnout as presented in the previous
section. We argue that ethnic homogeneity is not correlated with our measure of
democracy since the polity measure is an assessment of the legal structure of the country
rather than the country's actual capability of delivering democracy (which potentially
could be a function of the ethnic composition of the country). The results of using ethnic
homogeneity as an instrument for voter turnout appear in column 2 of Table 1.
Curiously, the coefficient on voter turnout increases and remains highly
significant while the coefficient on initial income becomes insignificant. Our new
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coefficient on voter turnout (almost twice as large as the previous one) implies that a one
standard deviation increase in voter turnout leads to a 3.88-point increase in our measure
of democracy. Again this change should be the result of considerable changes in the
functioning of institutions. Hence, our results corroborate Putnam's claim that social
capital is beneficial for democracy under the assumption that voter turnout is in fact a
reasonable measure of social capital.
4.2 Law and Order
As another measure of government quality, we consider the average "law &
order" score provided by Political Risk Services. According to PRS, their measure
reflects the degree to which the citizens of the country are willing to accept the
established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. It is unclear
what effect will social capital have on this measure. On one hand, if social capital is high,
formal institutions may be unnecessary in solving disputes. On the other, if social capital
is low, established institutions and their rulings may be necessary to solve disputes. Using




lawi =α0 +α1votei +α2 logGDPi
1950 +εi
The results of estimating this equation appear in the first column of Table 2.
Again it seems that voter turnout seems to be a very strong predictor of the
perceived success of the government. Our estimated voter turnout coefficient implies that
a one standard deviation increase in voter turnout is associated in a 0.63-point increase in
the average "law & order" score. Given that the scale of this score is 1-6, this change
should represent significant changes in the perceived effectiveness of the government.
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Curiously, these results imply that a large stock of social capital is associated with a
strong tradition of dependence on formal institutions, which contradicts Putnam's (2000)
view that dependence on written law is a substitute for weak social networks. However,
due to possible simultaneity biases between social capital and the acceptance of formal
institutions, we proceed again to instrument voter turnout.
Using average life expectancy at birth for 1950-2000 (from the US Census
Bureau), average infant mortality for the same period, and life expectancy at birth in 1970
(from the Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators) as
instruments for voter turnout, we arrive at the results in columns 2 through 4,
respectively, of Table 2. As in our polity IV regression, in our "law & order" IV
regressions the coefficient on voter turnout is larger that the non-instrumented
counterpart. In all three regressions this coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%
level, while the coefficient on the logarithm of initial GDP per capita is significant at the
10% level in the first and third regressions (for the second regression the coefficient has a
p-value of 0.135). Even when taking the lowest estimated coefficient (of the three
regressions) for voter turnout, a one standard deviation increase in voter turnout is
associated with a 1.53-point increase in the "law & order" score. Thus, even when
controlling for possible simultaneity biases we can still argue that strong social networks
are associated with the acceptance of formal legal institutions.
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Table 2
1 2 3 4
















































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level,  **
significant at 1% level.
4.3 Constraints on the Executive
A hallmark of an effective government is the set of restrictions a government
places on itself to guarantee the protection of individuals from abuses of the government.
As measure of this type of restrictions, we define 
€ 
xconsti as the average (for the period
1950-2000) score a country receives based on the number of institutionalized constraints
it places on the executive. The results in the first column of Table 3 are the consequence
of estimating the following equation:
(3) 
€ 
xconsti =α0 +α1votei +α2 logGDPi
1950 +εi
The highly significant coefficient on voter turnout seems to imply that closely-
knit societies demand strong accountability from their rulers, while the insignificant
coefficient on initial income implies that income in 1950 does not determine the number
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of constraints on the executive. Our estimated coefficient implies that a one standard
deviation increase in voter turnout is associated with a 1.64-point increase in the score of
institutionalized constraints on the executive. Because effectively constrained
governments may evoke trust in citizens who then vote, reverse causality may be driving
our overly optimistic results. As with our previous IV regressions, we instrument voter
turnout with average life expectancy at birth, average infant mortality, and life
expectancy at birth in 1970. The results of running these IV specifications appear in the
second, third, and fourth columns (respectively) of Table 3.
In all three IV regressions voter turnout is significant while initial income is not.
In the first two regressions, voter turnout is significant only at the 10% (however the p-
value for the first regression is 0.078). The very large (24.77) and highly significant
coefficient on voter turnout in the third coefficient disagrees substantially with the results
of the other two IV regressions and thus casts some doubt on the precise magnitude of the
impact of voter turnout on executive constraints. However, the three regressions
combined do provide some evidence that voter turnout has a positive and significant
(both statistically and economically) effect on the structure of constraints on the
executive. Next, we examine whether our measure of social capital has any effect on
more basic measures of government quality such as corruption, contract enforcement and,
the protection of property rights.
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Table  3
1 2 3 4
















































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level,  **
significant at 1% level.
4.4 Corruption 
In his study of regions of Italy, Putnam finds that regions such as Emilia-
Romagna and Tuscany —where strong traditions of civic involvement and social
solidarity had existed over thousands of years (some traditions traced back to the eleventh
century)— had representative governments that were efficient in managing the public's
business and satisfying their constituents. Regions such as Calabria and Sicily —which
were not characterized by strong traditions of civic involvement— had much more
inefficient, lethargic and corrupt governments.   Putnam concludes that the factor driving
these divergent stories is social capital. He argues that social capital facilitates the
performance of the representative government since social capital can help lower
transactions costs and ease dilemmas of collective action. Given this argument, the next
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two dependent variables we consider are indices of corruption and property rights. If it
were true that social capital lowers transaction costs and eases dilemmas of collective
action then we would expect our measure of social capital to have a strong significant
effect on each of these indices.
To examine the effect that voter turnout may have on corruption, we consider the
average corruption score for 1982-1995 from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) as previously used in the literature by Levine et al. (2000) and Mauro (1995). For
this index a higher score indicates a low level of corruption.  Therefore we define the
following equation to be estimated:
(4) 
€ 
corrupti =α0 +α1votei +α2 logGDPi
1950 +εi
Results of estimating this equation appear in column 1 of Table 4.
Judging by the significance and magnitude of the estimated coefficient on voter
turnout it seems that it does have an important corruption ameliorating effect. For our
restricted sample (N=33) a one-standard deviation (16 percentage points) increase in
voter turnout is associated with a 0.8-point increase in the corruption score—meaning
corruption should decrease. Similarly, a one-standard deviation (0.7 log points) increase
in initial GDP per capita leads to a 1.34-point increase in the corruption score. Again in
this scenario it is not entirely clear that voter turnout can be taken as exogenous. From a
very simplistic point of view, it could be possible that given high levels of corruption
citizens become jaded and indifferent to their country's politics and thus refrain from
voting. Conversely, low levels of corruption may induce high voter turnout. To evade
these possibilities we instrument voter turnout in equation (4) with infant mortality, life
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expectancy at birth, and ethnic homogeneity. The results of these IV regressions appear
in columns 2 through 4 of Table 4.
Again as with most of our previous IV regressions, the instrumented version of
the coefficient on voter turnout is large and remains highly significant. In all three IV
regressions initial income is insignificant and judging by the R2 statistics, the explanatory
power of the regressors of equation (4) is reduced when voter turnout is instrumented.
However, the conclusion we arrive at remains the same—voter turnout reduces the
incidence of corruption. Our smallest estimated coefficient on voter turnout implies that a
one-standard deviation increase in voter turnout induces roughly a 2.3-point increase in
the corruption score (which ranges from 0 to 10). This change in the corruption score
should represent noticeable changes in the delivery of public goods.
Table 4
1 2 3 4
















































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level,  **
significant at 1% level.
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4.5 Contract Enforcement and Property Rights
In an influential article, North and Weingast (1989) emphasize the role of the
government in protecting and enforcing property rights and the importance of these rights
in the Industrial Revolution.  For our discussion it seems only natural to verify if social
capital influences how fervently a government enforces property rights. To test this claim




proprightsi . The first variable is
taken from the data set used in Levine et al. (2000) and is a combined measure of law and
order tradition and the risk that a government may change the terms of a contract after it
has been signed. The second variable is a property rights score in 2000 taken from the
Index of Economic Freedom. Using the first variable as the dependent variable in our
regression we arrive at the results presented in the first column of Table 5.
Our initial results when using 
€ 
enforcei as a dependent variable are very similar to
those when using 
€ 
lawi  as a dependent variable. This serves as a consistency check since
€ 
enforcei includes a measure of law and order. While the coefficient on voting in this
regression is only significant at the 10% level (compared to 1% in the regression in
column 3 of Table 1) the difference in magnitude between each of estimated coefficients
is roughly 0.18.
Again to circumvent the possible simultaneity between our dependent variable
and social capital, we instrument voter turnout with infant mortality, life expectancy and
ethnic homogeneity. The results of using these measures as instruments of social capital
appear in the second through fourth columns of Table 5. We are able to conclude that
voter turnout does have a significant impact on increasing the tradition of law and order
in a country and in reducing the risk of a government changing the terms of a contract
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after it has been signed. The results when using ethnic homogeneity as an instrument are
the most significant and they imply that a one-standard deviation (0.15) increase in voter
turnout leads to a 1.5-point increase in the 
€ 
enforcei score, which ranges from 1 to 10 (10
being strong law and order tradition and low risk of contract alteration).
Table 5
1 2 3 4
















































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level,  **
significant at 1% level.
Finally, we consider the impact social capital has on property rights. Given the
strong effect that social capital has on law and order and contract enforcement, intuitively
we would expect that a more basic measure (such as property rights) also to be
significantly explained by our measure of social capital. However, in unreported
regressions we were unable to conclude that social capital had a significant effect on a
measure of risk of expropriation (which is highly negatively correlated with our property
rights measure). Thus, a priori it is unclear if voter turnout will have a significant impact
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on property rights. The results of using property rights as the dependent variable in our
regressions appear in column 1 of Table 6.
The OLS estimator for the coefficient on voter turnout implies a significant
decrease in the property rights score (which means the government protects property
rights well) when social capital is increased. For example, a 10% increase in voter turnout
decreases the property rights score by 0.16 points. Higher initial income is also associated
with a lower property rights score (or equivalently stronger protection of property rights
by the government). While the magnitude of the effect voter turnout has on this
dependent variable is much smaller than on previous dependent variables, the scale for
the property rights score is also much smaller (1 to 3). Even when we instrument voter
turnout with infant mortality, life expectancy, and ethnic homogeneity (columns 2
through 4 respectively of Table 6) the effect of voter turnout on property rights remains
significant and actually increases in magnitude. Thus, our results suggest that social
capital may have a favorable impact on the enforcement of property rights.
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Table 6
1 2 3 4
















































Notes: t-ratios in parentheses.  ♦ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level,  **
significant at 1% level.
4.6 Summary
To summarize, in this chapter we have presented considerable evidence in favor
of the hypothesis that social capital improves government performance. For a series of
measures of government performance and effectiveness we have found consistent
evidence that higher social capital increases government efficiency and accountability. It
seems then that a "culture of democracy" or of civic and political participation is
important to maintain checks and balances on the government. From a simplistic point of
view, if political and civic participation represent the demand for more public goods, then
the government acting as a supplier of public goods will produce more of them. The
results presented in this chapter also suggest that our simplistic view of voter turnout
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having a direct effect on economic growth was incorrect. Rather, the long-term gains of
increases in social capital in the form of political participation may come in the form of
better institutions. In turn, better institutions should foster long-term growth.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this thesis was to propose a new measure of social capital and
verify the robustness of results presented in previous articles measuring the social capital
effect on economic growth. Compared with previous measures of social capital, voter
turnout seems to be more adequate for cross-country studies since it is immune to cultural
biases in reporting and interpretation. Given its availability over extensive time periods,
our measure of social capital should also capture long-run features of the social climate of
each country we consider. Finally, our measure is inherently easier to quantify than trust
and civic norms.
 Following a specification similar to that used by Knack and Keefer (1997), our
results from section 3 seemed to disagree with their findings, even once controlling for
simultaneity biases by using instruments similar to the ones used in their investigation.
Rather than contradicting previous work, our initial results may suggest that compared to
the short-run, the impact social capital has on growth is less apparent in the long run.
Social capital may help for short-run adjustments in economic performance, while in the
long-run standard arguments to reach the balanced growth path apply. In addition, the
mechanism through which social capital impacts long-run economic performance may
not be as direct as our initial specification (and previous literature) assumes.
  In consideration of this problem we examined the possibility that social capital
influences government performance in section 4. Using a specification similar to the one
proposed in La Porta et al. (1997), we find strong evidence that our measure of social
capital increases government performance (measured using several indices). In particular,
we find that more social capital is associated with less corruption, stronger property
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rights, less risk of contract alteration, a stronger tradition of law and order and, overall
more democracy in a nation.
Thus, our results raise questions about the previous findings in the literature and
how precisely do the World Values Surveys represent social capital. Since our
investigation covers a longer time period than previous investigations [i.e. La Porta et al.
(1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997)], new research should consider using voter turnout
as a measure of social capital over shorter periods of time in order to categorically verify
the results of the formerly mentioned investigations.
Our results suggest that: (1) the social capital effect on economic performance is
different in the short-run and long-run; and (2) the results derived from short-run studies
may be overly optimistic of the true impact social capital has on economic performance.
This optimism may stem from the inadequacy of the measures of social capital derived
from the WVS.
Our results also suggest that if social capital has any impact on long-run growth it
may be by improving government performance that subsequently aids the
accomplishment of economic outcomes. While the absence of formal theory may
deteriorate the veracity of our empirical results, further research should attempt to
support this claim. Hall and Jones (1999) suggest that a large portion of differences in
output per worker between countries can be attributed to social infrastructure. "A
country's long-run economic performance is determined primarily by the institutions and
government policies that make up the economic environment within which individuals
and firms make investments, create and transfer ideas, and produce goods and services
(pg. 114)." Hall and Jones (1999) thus argue that differences in capital accumulation,
62
educational attainment and productivity (which help explain differences in income across
countries) are caused by differences in social infrastructure across countries. Our results
from section 4 could suggest that social capital may be an observable determinant of
social infrastructure—a result that can be useful in other studies. Following Hall and
Jones' (1999) discussion we can then argue that social capital in the form of political
participation improves the social infrastructure of a nation and thus contributes to growth.
The question of the endogenous determination of social capital then arises. While our
work provides some suggestions on how to deal with this problem, further research
should consider this question theoretically and empirically.
While the estimates in section 4 constitute upper bounds of the true effect that
social capital has on government performance (since voter turnout can overstate the
actual level of social capital in a nation because it can be done entirely alone), our
estimated effects are large enough that even after some downgrading, social capital could
remain significant for government performance. Conversely, since we only look at
parliamentary elections, voter turnout in these elections can understate the true level of
political participation (and hence social capital in a nation) if presidential elections are
more attractive from a voting standpoint. Further research should try to study more
countries, consider separately presidential and parliamentary elections and, examine
longer time periods in order to further generalize the findings presented in this thesis.
Also, the application of time-series methods to our data would be useful to fully account
for inter-temporal changes in social capital.
Most importantly, it is necessary to admit that when dealing with such an
intangible object such as social capital, qualitative results are more instructive than
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quantitative results. Adhering to the belief that sustained increases in voter turnout will
lead to 2-point increases in polity scores is somewhat naive. Rather, our quantitative
results should serve as guidelines for qualitative statements such as " sustained increases
in voter turnout (which represent increases in social capital) can potentially lead to
significant improvements in political competitiveness that subsequently lead to increases
in the delivery of public goods which finally enhance growth."
In addition, new research could consider natural experiments. Given that social
capital may be considered as a determinant of social infrastructure, new research could
examine changes in social capital during periods when institutions are observably
changing. For example, new research could examine trends in the level of social capital
of Chile leading up to the removal of Salvador Allende and thereafter the instatement of
Augusto Pinochet. Case studies could help provide evidence for the increasing role of
social capital in determining the social infrastructure of a nation when institutions are
weak. Likewise, case studies could demonstrate that social capital is only important for
the social infrastructure of a nation only once institutions are well established.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the importance of our findings in a more
general context. Relevant to the present social state of the world is our discussion of a
"culture of democracy." Our empirical results in section 4 stress the importance of a
"culture of democracy" for the improvement of institutions. Over two centuries ago De
Tocqueville (1984) highlighted the importance of civic participation in early America.
Two centuries later it seems that civic engagement and political participation may regain
relevance in countries such as Iraq. The hypothesis of this thesis would argue that the
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development of new fruitful institutions in Iraq would benefit from social cooperation
within the nation. History shall serve as the final judge of our conclusions.
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Data Appendix
In this appendix we include the definition of each variable, how it was calculated
and its source. We also provide the list of countries in our data set.
Variable Definition and Calculation Source
TRUST percentage of people in each
nation responding "most
people can be trusted
Knack and Keefer (1997)
€ 
votei number of votes divided by
the Voting Age Population
figure (number of people in
population who meet age
requirements to vote). Only
parliamentary elections
occurring in 1950-2000 were
considered. This value is the
average over all elections in






2000 logarithm of GDP per capita
in  2000
Penn World Tables 6.1
€ 
log ki
2000 logarithm of the capital stock
per capita in the year 2000.
This value was approximated
by using investment per
capita levels for each year in
the 1950-2000 period and
assuming a 10% depreciation









δ  denotes depreciation
Penn World Tables 6.1
€ 
logGDPi
1950 logarithm of GDP per capita
in 1950
Penn World Tables 6.1
€ 
enrolli gross secondary enrollment
ratio. Gross secondary
enrollment (regardless of age)
divided by the population of
the age group that
corresponds to this level of









1980 percentage of the population
in 1980 that is Catholic
Levine et al. (2000)
€ 
musi
1980 percentage of the population
in 1980 that is Muslim
Levine et al. (2000)
€ 
frenchi dummy variable for French
legal origin
Levine et al. (2000)
€ 
britishi dummy variable for British
legal origin
Levine et al. (2000)
€ 
germani dummy variable for German
legal origin
Levine et al. (2000)
life expectancy at birth in
1970
number of years a newborn
would life if prevailing
patterns of mortality at the





average life expectancy number of years a newborn
would life if prevailing
patterns of mortality at the
time of birth remain the same.
This value is averaged for
each year in 1950-2000.
International Data Base (IDB)
US Census Bureau
 average infant mortality number of infant deaths per
1,000  live births. This value
is averaged over each year in
1950-2000.
IDB
average crude death rate number of deaths per 1,000 in
population. This value was
averaged over the longest
time period within the years
of 1950-2000 with a
minimum requirement of a 20
year period.
IDB
middle percent of the population
between the ages of 15 and 64
(inclusive). This value was
averaged over the period
1950-2000.
IDB
international crime rates death intentionally inflicted to
a visitor in a foreign country,
per 100,000 in population.
These are mean values
covering the period 1950-
2000 as reported by the
source.
Fajnzylber et al. (1998)
riots number of violent
demonstrations or clashes of
more than 100 citizens







involving the use of physical
force
Indicators (2000)
law students in 1960
total number of law students
in 1960. For the US and UK
total number of law graduates
was used since data on




students in the social sciences
in 1960





homogeni proportion of the population










minorityi dummy for a country where a




insurgencyi dummy for a country where






autocracy score (averaged for
each year over 1950-2000).
The democracy is an eleven-





on the chief executive. The
autocracy score is also an
eleven-point score based the




lawi measure of the tradition of
law and order in a nation.
Averaged over 1985-1998




xconsti measure of the number of




corrupti index of corruption with 0
high corruption and 10
corruption. Averaged over
1982-1995.








enforcei average of rule of law score
and contract risk score for
years 1982-1995




proprightsi rating of property rights in
2000 on a scale of 1 (strong)
to 3 (weak)
Index of Economic Freedom
€ 
bureaui measure of bureaucratic
efficiency which considers
the efficiency of the judiciary
system, red tape and
corruption over the period
1980-1983.
Levine et al. (2000). Business
International Corporation
(1984). Mauro (1995).
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